Who’s to blame for 9/11? Everybody? Nobody? Too confusing to tell? To even ask this question in America today is to risk being tagged with the ‘conspiracy theory’ thing. But there’s a lot to look at before we even get that far along. The real first question to be asked–because the record will have empirical data documentation how did the Bush administration compare to Clinton’s in preparing for and protecting against a 9/11 scale attack? 

The problem is that once one begins on a such a search, one is led inevitably to the conclusion that there was a deliberate lack of focus on the most dangerous spots 

“The Clinton administration made a mistake last year by focusing too tightly on bin Laden and ‘personalizing terrorism’…”   Bush State Dept senior official to CNN, early 2001

“I just don’t understand why we are beginning by talking about this one man bin Laden… who cares about a little terrorist in Afghanistan?”   Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, objecting to counterterrorism czar Richard Clark, early 2001

“I had realized there on the ground in Florida we were under attack. But never did I dream we would have been under attack this way.”   George W. Bush, 9.13.01

“I don’t think anybody could have predicted that they would try to use an airplane as a missile, a hijacked airplane as a missile,”   Condoleeza Rice, 5.16.02

“What we did in the eight months [before 9/11] was at least as aggressive as what the Clinton administration did in the preceding years.”  Condoleeza Rice, 2006

The Accountability Party GOP blamed Bill Clinton for 9/11 and spun George W as an quick-study newcomer caught by suprise in poorly-prepared-f0r evildoer intrigue. The record, however, shows quite differently. Despite the mumbo jumbo quoted above, there were so many warnings about the coming 9/11 attacks that even a deranged chimpanzee could have properly interpreted them and effectively intervened. Well… maybe not.

At any rate, this essay sets aside the blame-Clinton game for a bit and looks squarely at who was doing what to prepare against a 9/11. What follows is a small compilation of snafus, unheeded warnings and warning signs, scrapped investigations, and buried or discarded leads that would require thousands of pages to fully document:

• In January 2001, Senators Hart and Rudman present Rice, Rumsfeld, and Powell with the final report of the US Commission on 21st Century National Security. The bipartisan report contains 50 recommendations on combatting terrorism. Bush stonewalls for months and blocks any Congressional implementation of the Commission’s more urgent suggestions. The White House then announces, in May, that Cheney will commission his own study of domestic and international terrorism. This group does not meet until the 4th of September, one week before 9/11.
• Outgoing counterterrorism tsar, Richard Clarke (considered by most the government’s foremost expert on al Qaeda and other terror groups), briefs Condi Rice and other incoming National Security officials and advisors. He urgently recommends prioritizing al Qaeda “number one national security threat” and warns that bin Laden is preparing large-scale attacks against US interests–probably inside the U.S. Rice demotes Clark, but he keeps sounding the alarm until 9/11.
• Bush’s first National Security Council meeting focuses almost entirely on ‘Iraqi terrorism’ and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; al Qaeda is not discussed.
• Immediately after taking office, Bush begins planning the 2002 budget. More than half a billion dollars is slashed from the Justice Department’s counterterrorism funding. FBI requests for more field agents, translators and intelligence analysts is ignored.  Programs that provide state and local counterterrorism grants are cut. The Administration also vetoes a proposed $800 million transfer of funds from missile defense into counterterrorism.
• Bush abandons a Clinton-era global crackdown on offshore financial centers (like Liechtenstein and Antigua), whose banks help launder billions of dollars for terrorist groups like al-Qaeda. Most of these banks also provide tax shelters for the world’s richest.
• The Treasury Department halts US cooperation with a thirty-nation effort to disrupt terrorist revenue streams. The Republican House then cuts off funding for the National Foreign Terrorist Asset Tracking Center.
• The clandestine Able Danger data mining unit, charged with tracking al Qaeda overseas and in America, is shut down despite protests from the intelligence community.
• The FBI counterterrorism probe into the bombing of the U.S. Cole is stymied by the Bush State Department, and makes little additional progress after January, 2001. The probe had uncovered much of the al Qaeda network based in Yemen and identified two Cole bombing co-conspirators (who later enter the U.S. and pilot Flight 77 into the Pentagon).
• Bush makes the development of an anti-ballistic missile shield his top security priority, after first backing out of the US-Russia ABM Treaty which prohibits such a shield. In speeches and in meetings between US, European, Russian and Chinese officials, Bush calls the acquistion of missiles by rogue states “today’s most urgent threat.” He rarely comments on al Qaeda or domestic terrorism.
• CIA operatives complain of a major NSA policy shift which results in restrictions on many ongoing investigations- such as that of Pakistani nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan, who receives extensive Saudi financing and sells nuclear technology to Iran and others.
• Bush scraps the Inter-agency Working Groups, which facilitate inter-agency intelligence communication. He appoints Condi Rice the executive secretary of eleven new replacement committees. Rice, who later claims ignorance while blaming the intelligence community for its failure on 9/11, chairs six of the committees herself, including Counter-Terrorism and National Preparedness, Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence, and Records Access and Information Security.
• At Bush’s first meeting with NATO heads of state, he outlines his top five defense issues. Missile defense is #1; terrorism is not on the list.
• FBI agent Robert Wright officially complains: “Until the investigative responsibilities for terrorism are removed from the FBI, I will not feel safe… There is virtually no effort on the part of the FBI’s International Terrorism Unit to neutralize known and suspected terrorists residing within the US.”
• At Bush’s second National Security Council meeting, the issue of regime change in Iraq is a central topic, domestic terrorism is not discussed.
• The Bush White House ignores “an unprecedentedly detailed report” said to contain an “astonishing degree of information” compiled by Russia’s UN mission. The report provides a list of “all bin Laden’s bases, details of his al Qaeda network, his government contacts and foreign advisers,” and enough information to potentially locate and kill him.
• The UN Security Council passes a US-Russian resolution requiring member states to “freeze without delay” funds of those listed as designated terrorists. At least five reported al Qaeda leaders are on the list, including bin Laden’s security coordinator and finance manager. Despite urgent pleas by the UN and EU, the Republicans refuse to act until after 9/11.
• Bush’s State Department issues its 2001 report on terrorism. While the report cites the Taliban’s support for international terrorism, there are no photographs or detailed descriptions of bin Laden or al Qaeda. A senior State Department official tells CNN that the Clinton administration “made a mistake last year by focusing too tightly on bin Laden and ‘personalizing terrorism’ … describing parts of the elephant and not the whole beast.”
• Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz repeatedly discounts counterterrorism advisors like Richard Clarke during NSC meetings, with on-the-record comments like “I just don’t understand why we are beginning by talking about this one man bin Laden,” and “Who cares about a little terrorist in Afghanistan?”
• Wolfowitz insists the US should focus on Iraqi-sponsored terrorism, and rejects the CIA’s assertions that Iraq is not engaging in anti-US terrorism.

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